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January 10, 2020 
 
GOOGLE V. ORACLE AMICUS MERITS STAGE BRIEF: VINDICATING 
IP’S CHANNELING PRINCIPLE AND RESTORING JURISDICTIONAL 
BALANCE TO SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
 
Peter S. Menell, David Nimmer, and Shyamkrishna Balganesh 
Abstract 
The Federal Circuit’s decisions in Oracle v. Google conflict with this Court’s seminal 
decision in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), misinterpret Congress’s codification of this 
Court’s fundamental channeling principle and related limiting doctrines, and upend nearly three 
decades of sound, well-settled, and critically important decisions of multiple regional circuits on 
the scope of copyright protection for computer software. Based on the fundamental channeling 
principle enunciated in Baker v. Selden, as reflected in § 102(b) of the Copyright Act, the 
functional requirements of APIs for computer systems and devices, like the internal workings of 
other machines, are outside of the scope of copyright protection even as non-merged aspects of 
the implementing code for APIs are protectable. Google independently implemented the 
functional specifications of the 37 APIs at issue and hence did not infringe Oracle’s copyrights. 
By way of brief illustration, copyright protects artistic and literary works, such as a creative 
metal sculpture or haiku. Nonetheless, the proprietors of those works cannot complain when 
third parties replicate elements of that expression that are essential to the operation of a particular 
machine. For instance, a car manufacturer could secure the ignition switch for its automobiles via 
a metal key with an original cut pattern on the blade. Although that pattern might be protected as 
a modern sculpture, the car manufacturer could not use copyright law to prevent others from 
utilizing the same expression for the purpose of starting the car. The same consideration applies 
to a car manufacturer that secures a digital ignition switch via entry of a haiku. Copyright law 
does not bar third parties from utilizing the necessary expression of that otherwise protectable 
literary work for the purpose of starting the car. The computer program implementing that digital 
key may be protected by copyright law, but the law places no bar on copying the essential 
functional elements needed to operate the ignition switch—the haiku text and any other 
indispensable functional features of the computer program. 
As Baker v. Selden recognized, copyright law’s limiting doctrines implement a 
constitutional and statutory balance intended to promote progress by channeling functional 
features exclusively to the utility patent regime. Although copyright can protect separable 
expressive features, such as surface ornamentation of an ignition key or non-merged 
implementing code of a digital ignition key, it does not bar the use of functional specifications—
the essential technological elements. Only utility patent law can protect those features. 
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INTEREST OF AMICI1 
 The authors of this brief are professors of law 
who study and teach intellectual property law. Their 
interest in filing this brief is to promote faithful in-
terpretation of U.S. copyright law. 
 Peter S. Menell is the Koret Professor of Law and 
co-founder and director of the Berkeley Center for Law 
& Technology (BCLT) at the University of California 
at Berkeley. He holds a law degree and a doctorate 
degree in economics. Professor Menell has authored 
or co-authored more than 100 articles and authored, 
co-authored, or edited 15 books, including leading 
casebooks, intellectual property treatises (including 
sections of NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT), and research hand-
books. 
 David Nimmer is Of Counsel at Irell & Manella, 
LLP and Professor from Practice at the UCLA School 
of Law, where he regularly teaches copyright law and 
related subjects. Since 1985, he has authored NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT, maintaining up-to-date the treatise 
originally published in 1963 by his late father, Melville 
B. Nimmer. 
 
 1 Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 37.6, amici represent that no coun-
sel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no coun-
sel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the 
preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than 
amici made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submis-
sion. Petitioner and Respondent have consented in writing to the 
filing of this brief and were given 10 days notice of amici’s intent 
to file. 
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 Shyamkrishna Balganesh is Professor of Law and 
Co-Director of the Center for Technology, Innovation & 
Competition (CTIC) at the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School. His research and teaching focus on the in-
terplay of intellectual property law, innovation policy, 
and the common law. He co-authored the portions of 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT relating to Baker v. Selden, 101 
U.S. 99 (1879). 
 In Spring 2018, the HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & 
TECHNOLOGY published a Special Issue on copyright 
protection for computer software focusing on Oracle v. 
Google. The issue is framed by Professor Menell’s mon-
ograph-length lead article Rise of the API Copyright 
Dead?, which explores the rich history, technology, and 
legal issues surrounding this case. The Special Issue 
includes commentaries prepared by counsel from both 
sides of the litigation as well as leading academics. 
Professor Nimmer’s treatise, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 
has been cited extensively in the decisions below as 
well as throughout copyright jurisprudence. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The Federal Circuit’s decisions in Oracle v. Google 
conflict with this Court’s seminal decision in Baker v. 
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), misinterpret Congress’s 
codification of this Court’s fundamental channeling 
principle and related limiting doctrines, and upend 
nearly three decades of sound, well-settled, and criti-
cally important decisions of multiple regional circuits 
on the scope of copyright protection for computer 
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software. Based on the fundamental channeling prin-
ciple enunciated in Baker v. Selden, as reflected in 
§ 102(b) of the Copyright Act, the functional require-
ments of APIs for computer systems and devices, like 
the internal workings of other machines, are outside of 
the scope of copyright protection even as non-merged 
aspects of the implementing code for APIs are protect-
able. Google independently implemented the functional 
specifications of the 37 APIs at issue and hence did not 
infringe Oracle’s copyrights. 
 By way of brief illustration, copyright protects ar-
tistic and literary works, such as a creative metal 
sculpture or haiku. Nonetheless, the proprietors of 
those works cannot complain when third parties repli-
cate elements of that expression that are essential to 
the operation of a particular machine. For instance, a 
car manufacturer could secure the ignition switch for 
its automobiles via a metal key with an original cut 
pattern on the blade. Although that pattern might be 
protected as a modern sculpture, the car manufacturer 
could not use copyright law to prevent others from uti-
lizing the same expression for the purpose of starting 
the car. The same consideration applies to a car manu-
facturer that secures a digital ignition switch via entry 
of a haiku. Copyright law does not bar third parties 
from utilizing the necessary expression of that other-
wise protectable literary work for the purpose of start-
ing the car. The computer program implementing that 
digital key may be protected by copyright law, but the 
law places no bar on copying the essential functional 
elements needed to operate the ignition switch—the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3517514
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haiku text and any other indispensable functional fea-
tures of the computer program. 
 As Baker v. Selden recognized, copyright law’s 
limiting doctrines implement a constitutional and 
statutory balance intended to promote progress by 
channeling functional features exclusively to the 
utility patent regime. Although copyright can protect 
separable expressive features, such as surface orna-
mentation of an ignition key or non-merged imple-
menting code of a digital ignition key, it does not bar 
the use of functional specifications—the essential 
technological elements. Only utility patent law can 
protect those features. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
 As background for addressing copyright protec-
tion for the works at issue in this case, Section I re-
views the jurisprudential and legislative framework 
governing functional features of works of authorship. 
Section II then explains the pertinent technical back-
ground relating to the Java application program inter-
faces (APIs) and Google’s implementation of a subset 
of the APIs. With this background in place, Section III 
exposes the Federal Circuit’s critical errors and ex-
plains that Baker v. Selden and the Copyright Act 
enable software companies to develop interoperable 
and partially interoperable software programs so long 
as they independently implement prior developers’ 
functional specifications. It also discusses how the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3517514
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Federal Circuit’s approach upends well-reasoned and 
long-standing judicial decisions that have supported 
innovation and competition in the computer industry. 
Applying the proper interpretation of copyright protec-
tion for APIs to this case, Section IV confirms that 
Google’s independent implementation of functional 
specifications of the 37 APIs at issue did not infringe 
Oracle’s copyrights. As a result, there is no need for the 
Court to reach the fair use question. 
 
I. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL AND LEGISLA-
TIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 
FOR FUNCTIONAL FEATURES OF COM-
PUTER SOFTWARE 
 The intellectual property system has long ad-
dressed the interplay of the different modes of protec-
tion by establishing a clear hierarchical structure to 
ensure fidelity to Congress’s goals in promoting both 
technological and creative progress. The Patent Act re-
quires the inventor or discoverer of a process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter to meet strin-
gent threshold requirements of novelty, non-obvious-
ness, and disclosure in order to obtain 20 years of 
protection. See PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY, & 
ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGY AGE: 2019, Vol. I, at 16-26, 36-37, 156-68. 
In this way, patent protection aims to promote pioneer-
ing and cumulative innovation by providing a rela-
tively strong form of protection for a relatively short 
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duration. See Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, 
Economic Models of Innovation: Stand-Alone and Cu-
mulative Creativity, in BEN DEPOORTER & PETER S. 
MENELL (EDS.), RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOM-
ICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, VOLUME 1: THEORY 
119, 120-50 (2019). The Copyright Act, by contrast, 
merely requires that authors surmount a low original-
ity threshold to obtain relatively long-term protec-
tion—now life of the author plus 70 years. See NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01, 9.10[A][1] (2019). But because 
copyright protection is limited to the author’s original 
expression and does not extend to any ideas, proce-
dures, processes, methods of operation, concepts 
principles or discoveries, it has far less impact on com-
petition. 
 It would be nonsensical for copyright protection to 
encompass functional features of works of authorship, 
such as the gears and levers of a cash register (a sculp-
tural work) or the functional specifications for a digital 
cash register (computer software). Cash registers are 
machines that fall squarely within the province of util-
ity patent protection and have long been protected ac-
cordingly. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 271,363 (1883) (Cash 
Register and Indicator). If copyright protection extended 
to functional specifications of machines or processes, a 
sculptor could protect the precise configuration of gears 
and levers for a mechanical cash register or a computer 
programmer could protect the functioning of a partic-
ular digital cash register (perhaps a spreadsheet) merely 
by meeting copyright’s low originality threshold, thereby 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3517514
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circumventing the patent system’s high protection 
thresholds and relatively short duration. 
 This Court’s seminal decision in Baker v. Selden, 
later codified in the text and reflected in the legislative 
history of the Copyright Act, ensures that such illogical 
circumvention cannot occur. The channeling principle 
is clear: where functionality and expression inextrica-
bly coincide, copyright cannot subsist. Such elements 
can be protectable only if they satisfy patent law’s 
higher thresholds, and that protection lasts only 20 
years. 
 This principle does not deny the creativity of func-
tional sculpture and computer system design features. 
Those elements may be highly creative. But when the 
function and expression merge—even in a very specific 
configuration—copyright protection must give way to 
ensure the coherence of the intellectual property sys-
tem. The idea-expression dichotomy, merger doctrine, 
and other limiting doctrines (such as scenes a faire) 
implement a constitutional and statutory balance in-
tended to promote progress by channeling functional 
features exclusively to the utility patent regime. Alt-
hough copyright can protect separable expressive fea-
tures, such as surface ornamentation of a physical cash 
register or non-merged implementing code of a digital 
cash register, it cannot extend to functional specifica-
tions—the essential technological elements. Only util-
ity patent law can protect those features. 
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A. Baker v. Selden (1879) 
 This Court enunciated the structural foundation 
for the U.S. intellectual property system in Baker v. 
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). Accountant Charles Selden 
devised a condensed ledger bookkeeping system for 
government accounting. See CHARLES SELDEN, SELDEN’S 
CONDENSED LEDGER, OR BOOK-KEEPING SIMPLIFIED 
(1859). His new system consolidated the broad range 
of county transactions into a single ledger. The preface 
to Selden’s book proclaimed that this new system 
would “greatly simplify the accounts of extensive es-
tablishments doing credit business” and handle “an al-
most infinite variety of transactions,” qualifying it “to 
be classed among the greatest benefactions of the age.” 
Id. It noted that “[i]n addition to the copyrights of this 
little book, [Selden] has applied for a patent right to 
cover the forms of the publication, and prevent their 
indiscriminate use by the public.” Id. 
 In 1867, another accountant released BAKER’S 
REGISTER OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS WITH BAL-
ANCE SHEETS AND REPORTS FOR COUNTY AUDITORS AND 
TREASURERS, offering a similar accounting system with 
some advantages that made it easier to use. By 1871, 
Baker’s system was in wide use while Selden’s lan-
guished. 
 Selden’s widow sued Baker for copyright infringe-
ment. On appeal, this Court recognized that Selden 
sought to monopolize use of the accounting system or 
method explained in the book through copyright law, 
thereby gaining an exclusive right in the use of similar 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3517514
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ruled lines and headings. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 
at 101. While acknowledging that copyright law pro-
tected an author’s expression in conveying information 
on the subject of bookkeeping, the Court ruled that 
copyright protection could not extend to the “art”2 or 
methods thus described: 
To give to the author of the book an exclusive 
property in the art described therein, when no 
examination of its novelty has ever been offi-
cially made, would be a surprise and a fraud 
upon the public. That is the province of let-
ters-patent, not of copyright. The claim to an 
invention or discovery of an art or manufac-
ture must be subjected to the examination of 
the Patent Office before an exclusive right 
therein can be obtained; and it can only be se-
cured by a patent from the government. 
Id. at 102; see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.05[A][2][a]. 
Justice Bradley illustrated the proposition by not-
ing that although a physician could gain a copyright 
in a book about his medical discoveries and treat-
ments, protection could not extend to the new art, 
manufacture, or composition of matter described in 
the book absent a utility patent. Id. at 103-04. Like-
wise, 
The copyright of a work on mathematical 
science cannot give to the author an exclu-
sive right to the methods of operation which 
he propounds, or to the diagrams which he 
 
 2 In modern parlance, “art” refers to process. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 100(b); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). 
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employs to explain them, so as to prevent an 
engineer from using them whenever occasion 
requires. The very object of publishing a book 
on science or the useful arts is to communicate 
to the world the useful knowledge which it 
contains. But this object would be frustrated 
if the knowledge could not be used without in-
curring the guilt of piracy of the book. And 
where the art it teaches cannot be used with-
out employing the methods and diagrams 
used to illustrate the book, or such as are sim-
ilar to them, such methods and diagrams are 
to be considered as necessary incidents to the 
art, and given therewith to the public; not 
given for the purpose of publication in other 
works explanatory of the art, but for the pur-
pose of practical application. 
Id. at 103-04. Baker v. Selden thereby established the 
fundamental principle for channeling protection among 
the intellectual property regimes. See NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 2A.07[B][2]. 
 
B. The Modern Statutory Framework 
 By the mid-1970s, the question of whether copy-
right protection extends to computer software emerged 
as Congress was putting the finishing touches on the 
overhaul of the 1909 Copyright Act. Rather than fur-
ther delay completion of a legislative process that had 
been gestating nearly two decades, Congress estab-
lished the National Commission on New Technological 
Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”) to study the 
implications of the new technologies and recommend 
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revisions to federal intellectual property law. Act of 
Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873 
(1974). 
 As a stopgap, Congress included computer soft-
ware within the scope of “literary works,” one of the 
classes of “works of authorship” covered by the Copy-
right Act of 1976. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). The 
House Report explains that 
[t]he term ‘literary works’ does not connote 
any criterion of literary merit or qualitative 
value: it includes catalogs, directories, and 
similar factual, reference, or instructional 
works and compilations of data. It also in-
cludes computer data bases, and computer 
programs to the extent that they incorporate 
authorship in the programmer’s expression of 
original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas 
themselves. 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 53-54 (1976) (emphasis 
added). Other provisions of the 1976 Act endorsed 
Baker v. Selden and codified traditional exclusions for 
ideas and functional features. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
(“In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, pro-
cess, system, method of operation, concept, principle, 
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is 
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in  
such work.”); id. at § 101 (definition of “pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works” excludes “mechanical 
or utilitarian aspects”); see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
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§ 2A.06[A][1]. The legislative history further explains 
that 
Some concern has been expressed lest copy-
right in computer programs should extend 
protection to the methodology or processes 
adopted by the programmer, rather than 
merely to the ‘writing’ expressing his ideas. 
Section 102(b) is intended, among other 
things, to make clear that the expression 
adopted by the programmer is the copyright-
able element in a computer program, and that 
the actual processes or methods embodied 
in the program are not within the scope of 
the copyright law. 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 57 (emphasis added); S. REP. 
NO. 94-973, at 54 (1975) (same). 
 After conducting extensive hearings and receiving 
expert reports, a majority of CONTU concluded that 
the intellectual work embodied in computer software 
should be protected under copyright law, but subject to 
the fundamental principle that copyright cannot pro-
tect “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery” and the Su-
preme Court’s foundational decision on the idea- 
expression dichotomy in Baker v. Selden. See NAT’L 
COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, 
FINAL REPORT 1 (1979) (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)) 
(“CONTU REPORT”). CONTU recommended two changes 
to the 1976 Act, which Congress duly implemented. Act 
of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3007, 3028 
(1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2012)). Most 
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importantly, the CONTU REPORT confirmed that while 
“one is always free to make a machine perform any 
conceivable process (in the absence of a patent), . . . 
one is not free to take another’s program,” subject to 
copyright’s limiting doctrines. See CONTU REPORT at 
20 (footnote omitted). It further explained that: 
The ‘idea-expression identity’ exception pro-
vides that copyrighted language may be cop-
ied without infringing when there is but a 
limited number of ways to express a given 
idea. This rule is the logical extension of the 
fundamental principle that copyright cannot 
protect ideas. In the computer context this 
means that when specific instructions, even 
though previously copyrighted, are the only 
and essential means of accomplishing a given 
task, their later use by another will not 
amount to an infringement. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 Thus, while recognizing important limitations on 
copyright protection for computer software, including 
the § 102(b) limitations, Congress intended that soft-
ware programmers would garner protection for their 
program design and coding choices to the extent that 
the expression was separable from the underlying 
ideas and functionality. That is, the functional specifi-
cations required for a computer to operate in a partic-
ular way would remain outside the scope of copyright 
protection while the programmer’s implementation 
of such specifications would be eligible for copyright 
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protection. The general programming ideas, particular 
requirements to achieve any function, and unoriginal 
programming choices remain free for others to use 
while the creative effort in particularized implement-
ing code would gain protection. In this way, copyright 
would stand in the way of piracy and slavish copying 
without interfering with competition in machine func-
tionality. 
 
II. APPLICATION PROGRAM INTERFACES 
(APIs), JAVA APIs, AND GOOGLE’S IMPLE-
MENTATION OF A PARTIALLY INTEROP-
ERABLE MOBILE PLATFORM3 
 An API is a software interface or communication 
protocol between different parts of a computer pro-
gram or system intended to simplify implementation 
and maintenance of the software, control access to the 
software or hardware, and/or facilitate development of 
interoperable applications. See Application program-
ming interface, WIKIPEDIA; Peter S. Menell, Economic 
Analysis of Network Effects and Intellectual Property, 
34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 218, 224-30 (2019) (“Network 
Effects and IP”). An API can provide a feature or soft-
ware library for a software system. APIs can thus func-
tion as high-level programming short-cuts that allow 
programmers to more easily create applications that 
 
 3 This Section draws from Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API 
Copyright Dead?: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright Protection 
of Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, 31 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 303, 347-75 (2018) (“Rise of the API Copyright 
Dead”). 
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will interoperate with a system. Rather than program-
ming a feature from scratch, a programmer can access 
a pre-programmed feature by invoking the pertinent 
API function calls. Thus, programmers can more easily 
develop applications to run on a system by learning 
the API function calls. See id. at 224 (“The technical 
standards governing access to platforms, commonly re-
ferred to as application program interfaces (APIs) in 
the software industry, play a critical role in consumer 
and programmer adoption decisions, market entry, and 
competition.”). 
 API packages function as the gears and levers of a 
virtual machine. Declarations or function calls serve as 
keys to unlock computing methods and operations. 
 
A. Development of the Java Programming 
Environment 
 In 1990, a small programming team at Sun Micro-
systems set out to develop a new general programming 
language. The project evolved into an effort to create a 
programmable device for television set-top boxes. 
When Sun failed to interest consumer electronics or ca-
ble companies, Sun co-founder Bill Joy realized that 
the effort could be re-purposed to program webpages, 
the tantalizing new computing environment gaining 
salience in Silicon Valley. 
 The team soon produced “Java,” a simple, lean, 
platform-independent, real-time, embeddable, multi-
tasking programming language for web functionality. 
It used a similar syntax to the popular C programming 
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language, but was more compact, efficient, and secure. 
It enabled programmers to write “Java applets” (small 
application programs) that could run on Apple, Win-
dows, or UNIX machines without customization. It ac-
complished this versatility through the use of the Java 
Virtual Machine (“JVM”), an intermediate layer of 
software that checks the code and insulates end users’ 
computers from crashes and errors. Java enabled real-
time interactivity, multimedia, and animation, which 
greatly enhanced the dynamism of webpages. 
 Following the “ ‘profitless’ approach to building 
market share” that Netscape had employed in giving 
away its Navigator browser, Sun made the Java pro-
gramming language freely available. See David Bank, 
The Java Saga, WIRED (Dec. 1, 1995) (quoting Bill Joy, 
“There was a point at which I said, ‘Just screw it, let’s 
give it away.’ Let’s create a franchise.”). As part of its 
effort to establish Java as the standard programming 
language for the Internet and critical to its efforts to 
prevent Microsoft from undermining Java’s “Write 
Once, Run Anywhere” interoperability, Sun success-
fully pursued an open development path. See id. 
 Sun rolled out the first stable Java Development 
Kit in early 1996 and continued to expand features 
over the following year. The Java language comprises 
words, symbols, and pre-written programs to carry out 
various commands, such as printing something on the 
screen or performing a basic mathematical calculation. 
Sun organized sets of pre-written programs (methods, 
which are grouped in classes) into API packages (or 
class libraries). Each API package reflects a set of 
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declarations or functional specifications needed to in-
voke the methods; it functions as a mini-machine for 
performing particular pre-programmed functions. It is 
executed through detailed implementing code. Although 
Java programmers can write new code (methods) from 
scratch, the pre-written methods within the Java API 
packages provide convenient, efficient, reliable, stand-
ardized building blocks, thereby saving programmers 
tremendous time and effort. 
 In 1998, Sun released the Java 2 Standard Edition 
(“SE”) platform. It contained eight API packages, three 
of which—java.lang, java.io, and java.util—were nec-
essary to use the Java programming language. Sun 
gradually expanded the number of API packages, clas-
ses, and methods. Sun also established the Java Com-
munity Process to enable users to participate in the 
development of standard technical specifications for 
Java technology. By December 2006, the Java SE 6 
platform contained over 100 APIs. Although Sun made 
the Java programming language freely available, it li-
censed the APIs under the General Public License 
(“GPL”) that required users to make available any soft-
ware incorporating the licensed code on a “share and 
share alike” basis. See Network Effects and IP at 227-
28, 260-63. Sun also required licensees to ensure in-
teroperability with the entire Java platform. See Rise 
of the API Copyright Dead at 355. 
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B. Google’s Android Implementation 
 As smartphones emerged in the early 2000s, 
Google came to see that an open source platform for 
mobile communications was critical to enabling mobile 
devices to provide full web browsing capability. Build-
ing an open mobile communications platform, however, 
posed substantial challenges. A new operating system 
would need to be optimized for the small chips on 
which handsets were based. The devices would have to 
work in real-time. The platform had to be compact and 
optimized to the particular functionalities consumers 
would demand. In addition, the licensing model had to 
balance openness with downstream competition and 
innovation. Google did not believe that the GPL would 
provide sufficient flexibility for the range of players 
needed to establish a robust new mobile platform. In 
particular, Google worried that the viral share and 
share alike provision would discourage telecommuni-
cations companies and handset manufacturers (origi-
nal equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”)) from making 
investments in innovative features. A more permissive 
licensing model, in which downstream suppliers could 
build proprietary extensions on top of the base plat-
form, would better promote robust competition and in-
novation. See Network Effects and IP at 263-64. 
 Google’s Android team also believed that they 
would need to create an application programming 
environment that was familiar and easy to use. Java, 
with its wide adoption and vast programmer commu-
nity, was the obvious choice. They envisioned Android 
“as the world’s first Open Source handset solution 
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with built-in Google applications.” Android GPS 
[Google Product Strategy]: Key strategic decisions 
around Open Source at 2 (July 26, 2005), Trial Ex. 1, 
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 
975 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C 10-03561 WHA). An open 
source licensing model was critical to: (1) avoid the 
fragmentation resulting from closed and proprietary 
mobile platforms (like those offered by Microsoft and 
Symbian); (2) provide telecommunications companies 
and OEMs “a non-threatening solution for cross-ven-
dor compatibility”; and (3) build a “community force 
around Google handset APIs and applications.” Id. 
 Google engineers sought to use some of the Java 
APIs, but did not want to include the full set because 
of space and other design constraints. In addition, they 
wanted to add new APIs to support GPS, camera func-
tions, and user preferences. To provide access to a sub-
set of Java APIs, Google planned to develop a clean 
room implementation of the JVM and negotiate the 
first open source Java 2 Platform, Micro Edition JVM 
(“J2ME”) license with Sun. After a promising start, ne-
gotiations broke down when Sun refused to budge on 
full interoperability with J2ME. 
 As a result, Google opted to build the Android op-
erating system by emulating select Java API function-
alities with independently written implementing code. 
The “clean room” process draws on Judge Learned 
Hand’s originality corollary: “if by some magic a man 
who had never known it were to compose anew Keats’s 
Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if 
he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, 
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though they might of course copy Keats’s.” See Sheldon 
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (1936). 
The microcomputer industry developed around this 
principle. See Sony Comput. Entertainment v. Con-
nectix, 203 F.3d 596, 599-608 (9th Cir. 2000); Comput. 
Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 700, 707-10 (2d 
Cir. 1992); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 
1526-28 (9th Cir. 1992); Network Effects and IP at 
259-60. One team of programmers studies a program 
through legal means—such as by running the software 
to study its behavior, reviewing documentation, peel-
ing semiconductor chips, decompiling object code—to 
determine its functional specifications. Those specifica-
tions are handed off to a second team of programmers 
with no knowledge of the implementing code of the tar-
get computer program. They independently develop a 
computer program with the same functionality as the 
target program. See generally P. Anthony Sammi, 
Christopher A. Lisy & Andrew Gish, Good Clean Fun: 
Using Clean Room Procedures in Intellectual Property 
Litigation, 25 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3 (2013). 
 If the Java programming language is analogized 
to musical language, each API implementation can be 
characterized as a record album featuring songs (meth-
ods). Java Standard Edition (SE) then functions like an 
electrical-mechanical juke box, containing API record 
albums from which programmers can choose particu-
lar songs by invoking declarations (song titles). The 
fact that another juke box uses those song titles (dec-
larations) to invoke a known song (method) is purely 
functional: it does not copy a song (method), it merely 
identifies a known song (method). 
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 Unlike the early software industry, which oper-
ated through trade secrecy and released only object 
code versions to the public, Sun published the Java API 
functional specifications (declarations) to encourage 
others to develop applications. Even with access to the 
functional specifications, emulating APIs can be diffi-
cult. During an arduous two year process, the Android 
team independently developed its own implementing 
code for 37 of the 166 Java API packages in Java SE 
and an independent JVM. In this way, the Android op-
erating system emulated the functionality of known 
and tested APIs that fit the Android team’s design. An-
droid’s use of the Java function labels (declarations) 
enabled millions of Java programmers to quickly mas-
ter Android app development. Although Android apps 
were not fully interoperable with the Java SE plat-
form, they were similar enough and better optimized 
to the constraints of Android mobile devices. 
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III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DECISIONS 
CONFLICT WITH THIS COURT’S SEMINAL 
RULING IN BAKER V. SELDEN, MISINTER-
PRET CONGRESS’S CODIFICATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW’S FUN-
DAMENTAL CHANNELING PRINCIPLE AND 
COPYRIGHT’S LIMITING DOCTRINES, AND 
UPEND WELL-REASONED AND LONG-
STANDING JUDICIAL DECISIONS THAT 
HAVE SUPPORTED INNOVATION AND COM-
PETITION IN THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY 
 The unusual jurisdictional posture of the Oracle v. 
Google case required the Federal Circuit to apply 
Ninth Circuit law. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 
750 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Peter S. Menell, 
API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and 
Repairing the Oracle v. Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1515, 1576–95 (2016). Although 
we question the Federal Circuit’s fidelity to the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation of copyright law, see Rise of the 
API Copyright Dead at 427-43, this Court confronts 
the interpretation of copyright protection for computer 
software as a question of national law. As suggested in 
Section I, we believe that this Court’s seminal Baker v. 
Selden decision as later codified in the text and re-
flected in the legislative history of the Copyright Act 
provides the necessary blueprint. In a nutshell, the 
functional requirements of APIs, like the internal 
workings of other machines, stand outside the scope of 
copyright protection even as non-merged aspects of 
the implementing code for APIs are protectable under 
copyright law. 
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A. The Federal Circuit’s Decisions Conflict 
with Baker v. Selden 
 The Federal Circuit’s decisions directly conflict 
with Baker v. Selden, and the idea-expression and mer-
ger doctrines that it spawned. By affording Oracle ex-
clusive rights to not just the implementing code for 
Java APIs but also the declarations necessary to call 
those methods, the Federal Circuit has protected the 
computer system’s functionality through copyright 
law. 
 As Judge Alsup explained in the district court 
opinion, 
the rules of Java dictate the precise form of 
certain necessary lines of code called declara-
tions, whose precise and necessary form ex-
plains why Android and Java must be 
identical when it comes to those particular 
lines of code. That is, since there is only one 
way to declare a given method functionality, 
everyone using that function must write that 
specific line of code in the same way. 
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 
(N.D. Cal. 2012). Properly viewed, Sun’s devising of a 
package (e.g., java.security) using a particular class 
name (e.g., ProtectionDomain) and method name (e.g., 
ClassLoader) to effectuate a machine that responds to 
particular inputs and produces particular outputs 
should be deemed to place the otherwise creative 
names and essential structure outside of copyright 
protection, thereby enabling others (in the absence of 
a utility patent covering this process or machine) to 
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emulate (and interoperate with) this machine so long 
as they write their own implementation. The Federal 
Circuit has undermined those core principles. 
 
B. The Federal Circuit’s Decisions Miscon-
strue the Copyright Act 
 Congress codified Baker v. Selden’s fundamental 
channeling principle in the text of the Copyright Act of 
1976. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Beyond the statutory text, the 
legislative history states that “Section 102(b) is in-
tended, among other things, to make clear that the 
expression adopted by the programmer is the copy-
rightable element in a computer program, and that the 
actual processes or methods embodied in the program 
are not within the scope of the copyright law.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-1476 at 57 (1976) (emphasis added).4 CONTU 
clarifies that “one is always free to make a machine 
perform any conceivable process (in the absence of a 
patent) [so long as one does not] take another’s pro-
gram.” CONTU REPORT at 20 (emphasis added).5 
 
 4 The Federal Circuit omitted, without ellipses or explana-
tion, the critical italicized completion to the quoted sentence. See 
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d at 1367. 
 5 Courts have treated the CONTU REPORT as legislative 
history for the Computer Software Act of 1980, amending the 
1976 Act in accordance with CONTU’s recommendations. See 
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260-61 (5th Cir. 
1988); Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 
1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983). See generally NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 8.08[A][3]. 
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 In accordance with the Copyright Act, Google was 
entitled to make a mobile device (“a machine”) perform 
the same functions as a Java API package (a “conceiv-
able process”) with independently developed imple-
mentation code (i.e., not “another’s program”). Each 
Java API package constituted a particular subsystem 
within a larger particular computing environment. 
Hence, Google was justified in selecting a set of Java 
API packages and implementing them with original 
code to create a new machine. See Rise of the API Cop-
yright Dead at 433-52. 
 In support of its conclusions, the Federal Circuit 
also misconstrued this Court’s observations in Mazer 
v. Stein that “[n]either the Copyright Statute nor any 
other says that because a thing is patentable it may 
not be copyrighted.” Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 
F.3d at 1380. Contrary to the Federal Circuit’s decision, 
this observation was made in relation to the overlap 
between copyright law and design patent law. Mazer 
states that “the Mechanical Patent Law and Copyright 
Laws are mutually exclusive” and that it is only with 
regard to design patent law that an overlap with copy-
right can occur. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 215 n.33 
(1954). See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.07[D][4][b]. 
 Like copyright law, design patent protection is 
subservient to utility patent law with regard to func-
tional elements. The design patent statute was based 
on England’s design copyright statute. See Jason J. Du 
Mont & Mark D. Janis, The Origins of American 
Design Patent Protection, 88 INDIANA L.J. 837, 847, 
854-73 (2013). The original bill proposed a “sole and 
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exclusive copy-right” for the proprietor of any “new 
and original design” for specified articles of manufac-
ture. Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841). 
Following Senator Ruggles’ failed reelection bid, the 
design protection mantle was taken up by Patent Com-
missioner Henry Ellsworth, which resulted in an un-
fortunate labeling twist. In his 1841 Commissioner’s 
Report to Congress, Commissioner Ellsworth called 
upon Congress to establish a design protection regime 
under his authority at the Patent Office. See Thomas 
B. Hudson, A Brief History of the Development of De-
sign Patent Protection in the United States, 30 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 380, 380-81 (1948). Although 
bringing protection for designs under Patent Office ad-
ministration, the substance of the bill remained the 
same—protecting ornamental creativity as opposed to 
technological advances. The 1902 Design Patent Act, 
Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 783, § 4929, 32 Stat. 193 (1902), 
on which the 1952 Patent Act rests, makes this abun-
dantly clear. Under the 1902 Act, “Any person who has 
invented any new, original, and ornamental design for 
an article of manufacture” (emphasis added), may ap-
ply for a design patent. 
 Hence, the logic of Baker v. Selden applies equally 
to design patents as it does to copyrights. To the extent 
that an expressive feature of a design otherwise eligi-
ble for protection under either the Copyright Act or the 
design patent provisions of the Patent Act is merged 
or inextricably intertwined with a functional element, 
it can only be protected under utility patent law. 
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Accordingly, the Federal Circuit’s reliance on Mazer 
was misplaced. 
 
C. The Federal Circuit’s Decisions Revive 
and Exacerbate Circuit Splits on Copy-
rightability, Merger, and Fair Use 
 Copyright protection for computer software got 
off to an inauspicious start. See Rise of the API Copy-
right Dead at 322-26. In a case involving blatant and 
cavalier piracy of entire computer programs, the Third 
Circuit went overboard in addressing the defendant’s 
interoperability argument, stating in dicta that “total 
compatibility with independently developed applica-
tion programs . . . is a commercial and competitive 
objective which does not enter into the somewhat met-
aphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expres-
sions have merged.” Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin 
Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). Building 
on that decision, the Third Circuit ruled, in distin-
guishing protectable expression from unprotectable 
ideas, that 
the purpose or function of a utilitarian work 
would be the work’s idea, and everything that 
is not necessary to that purpose or function 
would be part of the expression of the idea. 
Where there are many means of achieving the 
desired purpose, then the particular means 
chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, 
there is expression, not idea. 
Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 
Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (emphasis in 
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original; citations omitted). In applying this rule, the 
court defined the idea as “the efficient management of 
a dental laboratory,” for which countless ways of ex-
pressing the idea would be possible. Id. 
 These decisions were roundly criticized. See, e.g., 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[F], at 13-62.34, at 13–4 
(1991) (explaining that “[t]he crucial flaw in [Whelan’s] 
reasoning is that it assumes that only one ‘idea,’ in 
copyright law terms, underlies any computer pro-
gram, and that once a separable idea can be identified, 
everything else must be expression”); Donald S. Chi-
sum, et al., LaST Frontier Conference on Copyright 
Protection of Computer Software, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 15, 
20-21 (1989); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope 
of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1074 (1989). As this scholarship 
emphasized, viewing the idea-expression dichotomy at 
such a high level of abstraction produced an overbroad 
scope of copyright protection because it resulted in all 
implementations of the idea garnering protection. Fur-
thermore, the Third Circuit’s misreading of merger 
analysis and the idea-expression doctrine implicitly al-
lowed copyright protection of procedures, processes, 
systems, and methods of operation that are expressly 
excluded under § 102(b). Drawing on this scholarship, 
other circuits developed alternative approaches to the 
scope of copyright protection that better comported 
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with Baker v. Selden and related fundamental limiting 
doctrines.6 
 Thus, after a rocky start, the regional circuit 
courts of appeals implemented a balanced framework 
for both protecting computer software against piracy 
and interpreting the idea-expression doctrine to en-
sure that copyright law excludes functional features of 
computer technology. Although the early overbroad 
Third Circuit cases remained on the books, software 
copyright law achieved stability, clarity, and sound rea-
soning. See Sony Comput. Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix 
Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) (reinforcing and 
extending Sega); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
 
 6 See Plains Cotton Coop. Assoc. v. Goodpasture Comput. 
Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987) (declining to fol-
low Whelan); Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 
705-06 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting dictum in Apple v. Franklin and 
the Whelan Associates analytical framework, and applying an 
abstraction-filtration-comparison framework based on Judge 
Learned Hand’s classic mode of analysis in Nichols v. Universal 
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)); Sega Enterprises Ltd. 
v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting 
Whelan); Gates Rubber v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 
834, 841 (10th Cir. 1993) (endorsing Altai); Apple Computer, Inc. 
v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff ’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 35 F.3d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994) (endorsing 
Altai); Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 
1335, 1341-43 (5th Cir. 1994) (endorsing Altai); Lotus Dev. Corp. 
v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that 
a menu command hierarchy that functions as a programming lan-
guage is an uncopyrightable method of operation), aff ’d by an 
equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); MiTek Holdings, Inc. 
v. ARCE Engineering Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1559 (11th Cir. 1996) (en-
dorsing Altai); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1375 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (endorsing Altai). 
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Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 534-37 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(reinforcing this evolution); see generally Peter S. Men-
ell, An Epitaph for Traditional Copyright Protection of 
Network Features of Computer Software, 43 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 651, 707-08 (1998). 
 By the mid to late 1990s, the software engineering 
community came to view high-level functions, labeling 
conventions, and the functional specifications of APIs 
as unprotectable under copyright law. See Brian 
Profitt, The Impact of Oracle’s Defense of API Copy-
rights, ITWORLD (Aug. 23, 2011) (observing that “[h]is-
torically, APIs have been regarded as not falling under 
copyright—the reasoning being that APIs are not cre-
ative implementations but rather statements of fact,” 
but also noting the issue had been clouded by the dis-
tinction between “open” and “closed” APIs). The Fed-
eral Circuit’s Oracle v. Google decisions revived and 
exacerbated the long dormant circuit splits relating to 
copyrightability of particular elements of computer 
software, copyright infringement analysis, and the ap-
plication of the Copyright Act’s fair use doctrine. See 
Michael Hussey, Copyright Captures APIs: A New 
Caution for Developers, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 3, 2015). 
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D. Reversing the Federal Circuit’s Oracle v. 
Google Decisions Maintains the Coher-
ence of the Intellectual Property System 
and Will Restore Peace and Clarity to 
the Computer Software Industry 
 Resolving this appeal through the clear and logical 
principles underlying Baker v. Selden maintains the 
coherence of the intellectual property system. The Su-
preme Court has reinforced these principles in its mod-
ern jurisprudence. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (observing 
that Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 of U.S. Constitution “reflects bal-
ance between the need to encourage innovation and 
the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition 
without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of 
Science and useful Arts’ ”); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mar-
keting Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29-30 (2001) (“Where 
the expired patent claimed the features in question, 
one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must 
carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is 
not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely 
an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the 
device.”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, 
Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000) (cautioning against pro-
tecting functional features through trademark law); cf. 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 
U.S. 23, 34 (2003) (warning that “allowing a cause of 
action under [Lanham Act] § 43(a) for reverse passing 
off would create a species of mutant copyright law that 
limits the public’s ‘federal right to “copy and to use” ’ 
expired copyrights”). 
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 Following the extensive litigation over copyright 
protection for APIs from the early 1980s through the 
mid-1990s, the regional circuit courts of appeals 
achieved a balanced approach that afforded protection 
for API implementations without hindering competi-
tion in the computer industry. The computer software 
industry embraced that balance and was able to func-
tion efficiently for more than a decade. The Federal Cir-
cuit’s Oracle v. Google decisions cast a dark cloud over 
standard industry practice. Restoring the clarity that 
prevailed prior to the Oracle v. Google decisions will 
promote innovation in an industry driven by complex, 
time-sensitive decisions. 
 Reversing the Oracle v. Google decisions will not 
deprive API developers of adequate intellectual prop-
erty protection. They retain protection against compa-
nies that copy their implementation. Moreover, by 
employing technological protection measures or dis-
tributing software products solely in object code form, 
software developers can slow development of interop-
erable products. Reverse engineering computer pro-
grams is laborious, slow, and expensive. Even when the 
functional specifications are publicly disclosed, as was 
the case with the Java APIs, re-implementing that 
functionality in a clean room is often costly and time-
consuming. And API developers can seek utility pa-
tents on technological innovations. 
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IV. GOOGLE INDEPENDENTLY IMPLEMENTED 
THE JAVA API FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICA-
TIONS AND THEREFORE DID NOT IN-
FRINGE ORACLE’S COPYRIGHTS 
 The record in this case establishes that after the 
Google-Sun negotiations over licensing the API imple-
mentations reached an impasse, Google undertook the 
burdensome and costly effort to implement the APIs 
independently. Although Oracle initially questioned 
the independence of those implementations, it con-
ceded that Google’s implementation did not infringe 
the Java API implementations other than through the 
copying of Java declarations and their structure, se-
quence, and organization. Inclusion of declarations 
was necessary to achieve the particular API function-
ality. Unless Google used the precise declarations, An-
droid could not emulate the functionality of the Java 
APIs. 
 Like the labels and columns of Selden’s accounting 
forms in Baker v. Selden, Java API declarations are not 
protected by copyright because they are essential to in-
voke, access, unlock, or operate a particular system or 
machine (specific Java API functions) even though the 
particular implementation code for those functional 
specifications is copyright-protected. To protect API 
declarations through copyright law would afford Ora-
cle patent-like protection over particular machine 
functions. 
 To make this point concrete, suppose that Sega 
had written its lockout code not as a peculiar sequence 
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of data, Sega, 955 F.2d at 1516, but rather as an origi-
nal haiku. Even though that haiku could be protected 
if distributed as poetry, it would be barred from copy-
right protection as lockout code. That is the reason for 
the Ninth Circuit’s unmistakable statement that the 
“functional requirements for compatibility with the 
Genesis [video game console are] aspects of Sega’s pro-
grams that are not protected by copyright. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b).” Id. at 1522.7 As essential “gears and levers” 
for particular digital machines, the Java API declara-
tions are not protectable under copyright law due to 
the overarching channeling principles reflected in 
Baker v. Selden and § 102(b) of the Copyright Act. 
 It is for that reason that it is irrelevant that the 
Java APIs might be highly creative. So are haikus. But 
if used to operate functional devices, their function 
merges with the expression and copyright cannot limit 
the functional use. Technological creativity is often 
among the most difficult, imaginative, and praisewor-
thy forms of creativity. Yet the overarching intellectual 
property system would be undermined if an inventor 
of a better analog cash register could bar competition 
 
 7 That case simultaneously rejected Sega’s attempt to invoke 
trademark laws to protect the lockout code that it voluntarily 
adopted, namely “PRODUCED BY OR UNDER LICENSE FROM 
SEGA ENTERPRISES LTD.” Id. at 1515. Having used that for-
mulation, Sega could not complain when third parties similarly 
employed it to gain the necessary access. Id. at 1528-30. As dis-
cussed above in § III(D), the coherence of the intellectual property 
system disallows overly aggressive plaintiffs from deploying “copy-
right,” “trademark,” or any other label for the improper purpose 
of excluding competitors from access to legitimate domains in or-
der to achieve program compatibility. 
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for life of the inventor plus 70 years by copyrighting 
the configuration of gears and levers as sculptural 
works or if a computer programmer who devised a bet-
ter digital cash register (e.g., a spreadsheet) could pro-
tect its invention for her or his life plus 70 years 
through copyright protection for the functional specifi-
cations (declarations). 
 The Federal Circuit confused the infringement 
analysis by accepting Oracle’s characterization of dec-
larations as “declaring code.” But declarations are not 
code but rather textual labels that specify properties of 
an identifier. A declaration 
declares what a word (identifier) ‘means.’ Dec-
larations are most commonly used for func-
tions, variables, constants, and classes, but 
can also be used for other entities such as enu-
merations and type definitions. Beyond the 
name (the identifier itself ) and the kind of en-
tity (function, variable, etc.), declarations typ-
ically specify the data type (for variables and 
constants), or the type signature (for functions); 
types may also include dimensions, such as for 
arrays. A declaration is used to announce the 
existence of the entity to the compiler. 
Declaration, WIKIPEDIA. 
 Nor do the API declarations attract protection on 
the ground that their structure, sequence, and organi-
zation is protectable. Combinations of methods in a 
machine are no more copyrightable than the configu-
ration of tools in a Swiss Army knife. Moreover, these 
labels are essential to accessing and operating a particu-
lar computing machine or method. The implementing 
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code is protectable, but not the declarations or struc-
ture of declarations necessary to operate a particular 
machine, method, or other functional component of a 
machine. 
 
V. THE FAIR USE ISSUE IS MOOT 
 In view of the foregoing establishing that Google 
did not infringe Oracle’s Java APIs copyrights, there is 
no reason for the Court to reach the fair use question. 
Cf. Rise of the API Copyright Dead at 471-73 (ex-
plaining that reliance on the inherently costly, time-
consuming, and unpredictable fair use doctrine is 
ill-suited for resolving API copyright disputes). 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, the Court should 
reverse the Federal Circuit’s 2014 and 2018 Oracle v. 
Google decisions and rule that Google has not in-
fringed Oracle’s Java API copyrights. 
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